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Weitzman, M . L . : D a s B e t e i l i g u n g s m o d e l l (The Share E c o n o m y ) . Voll-
beschäftigung d u r c h flexible Löhne. (Sonderband der Reihe "Wirtschafts-
wissenschaft im Spannungsfeld von Theorie und Politik") 209 S. Frank-
fur t -New York: Campus Verlag. 1987. 
This is the German translation of a by now famous book which has 
been published in English in 1984. Weitzman proposes in this book a 
microeconomic remedy for the macroeconomic Stagflation problem. To 
make such a kind of proposal is, I think, in itself a significant advance 
regarding policy recommendations. The usual arguments between the 
"Keynesians" and, well, the others on whether we should stimulate the 
economy, or better not risk inflation, became somewhat insipid after a 
decade of wear and tear. They do not touch the simple question of why we 
cannot have both price stability and füll employment to begin with. 
Weitzman does not answer this question either, but he proposes a change 
in the rules of the game which are intended to eure the Stagflation disease 
even if we don't know its cause. 
His proposal is profit sharing: each firm in the economy should be 
required to remunerate its workers with a certain fraction of its profits in 
addition to fixed wage payments, which are to be reduced aecordingly. In 
the long run, workers will be concerned with their overall income, irre-
spectively of whether this comes from residual or fixed payments, and the 
same holds true for the firms. As a result, such a change would not affect 
long-run supply and long-run demand in the economy, and, hence, long-
run equilibrium. In particular, the long-run marginal revenue produet of a 
worker will be equal to his income. (The flashy term for that is iso-
morphism between wage and share economies.) 
In the short run the wage and the share parameters are fixed, however, 
and the firm will compare the short-run marginal revenue produet of a 
worker with the fixed wage per worker, since a fixed share of profits must 
be paid to the workforce anyhow. As the fixed wage of a worker is only a 
part of his income, it is much below his long-run marginal revenue 
produet. Weitzman assumes implicitly that the short-run marginal revenue 
produet is not too much below the long-run marginal revenue produet. If 
this holds true, each firm will have an incentive, in the short run, to hire 
more workers, and all job seekers which might appear on the scene will 
immediately swallowed up by the firms. Horst Siebert, in his comment, 
describes this aptly as the "vacuum-cleaner effect". Thus unemployment 
cannot grow by feeding on itself. It even cannot take root. In other words: 
although a wage economy and a share economy will settle down at the 
same long-run equilibrium position, they react quite differently to 
short-run shocks. The wage economy reacts, aecording to Weitzman, 
through quantity adjustments first, and only thereafter through prices, 
whereas a share economy paralyzes effects of shifting marginal revenue 
produets of labor on the quantity of labor employed from the outset. Each 
worker's income reacts inversely to changes in the employment level of his 
firm in the short run, and this makes it so attractive for each firm to 
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employ more workers, but this device cannot be used to reduce labor costs 
in the long run since the workers will leave those firms which offer insuffi-
cient pay. (This absorption of unemployed labor in the short run works, of 
course, only within limits: the smaller the share parameter, the smaller 
will be the region of automatic stabilization.) Such as profit-sharing 
System has the beneficial "macroeconomic externality" of reducing unem-
ployment. This externality is not taken into account by the microeconomic 
agents. They have incentives to settle for fixed-wage contracts. Thus the 
profit sharing System must be enforced. 
The task of the book is to explain this idea to the non-specialist. In 
that, it succeeds extremely well. It should not be taken as a learned contri-
bution, since its purpose requires to simplify, and even over-simplify, the 
presentation of arguments, but it is perhaps for that reason that the book 
conveys Weitzman's vision better than his more technical papers which 
should be considered, however, as the basis for any serious evaluation 
even if they are less fun to read. (See Q u a r t e r l y J o u r n a l of E c o n o m i c s 52 
[1988]: 216-217, 223 for some references.) 
The first three chapters develop the idea that firms are price-takers for 
inputs and price-makers for Outputs. Firms are faced with downward-
sloping demand curves and maximize profits. Thus they fix prices such 
that expected marginal revenues and marginal costs are equated. Since 
prices are higher than marginal revenues, prices exceed marginal costs 
and firms are eager to seil additional Output at the posted price. Weitzman 
aptly describes this as a "buyer's paradise", but we should keep in mind 
that the buyers may pay more for that comfort than they would like to 
pay. 
If firms were monopsonistic competitors for labor inputs, we would 
have a "worker's paradise" by the same argument, but Weitzman unfortu-
nately assumes this away. Firms are conceived as price-takers for labor 
inputs. They hire workers until their marginal revenue produet equals the 
wage rate. This makes them indifferent between hiring or not hiring an 
additional worker at the prevailing wage. Although firms are eager to seil 
more at the posted price, they are not at all eager to hire more workers at 
the ruling wage rate, but a share system would establish the same 
eagerness to hire new workers at the ruling conditions (i.e. for given wage 
and share parameters) as we find it regarding supply. 
The following chapters develop this vision in various ways. It is 
argued that we don't really understand the Stagflation problem; that 
inflation is detrimental mainly because the public feels it is, rather than 
because it is really harmful; and various remedies like tight money, price 
controls or indexing are also explained. The central theme is, of course, 
profit sharing — how it might be administered and how it will change the 
modus operandi of a capitalist economy in a fundamental way. 
The book has proved to be excellent for teaching purposes. Students 
become usually very enthusiastic at the beginning and turn somewhat 
equivocal after a while, and the same holds true, as a rule, for professional 
economists. The idea needs much more elaboration and critical evalu-
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ation, especially with regard to the connection between long-run and 
short-run equilibrating processes, the underlying implicit postulätes on 
mobility, its compatibility (or rather incompatibility) with co-determi-
nation, etc. It is beyond my scope to contribute to this discussion here. 
I fear, however, that Weitzman's ideas will not gain the kind of careful 
attention they actually deserve. There have been too many instances 
where various Systems of profit-sharing have been proposed, but interest 
always faded after a while. The very influential German Council of 
Economic Advisers (Sachverständigenrat) recommended profit-sharing 
forcefully in 1975 for instance, albeit for reasons different from those 
given by Weitzman. Among the numerous contributions which were 
written at that time there are also some proposals which are very close in 
spirit to Weitzman's proposal. (See, for example, FitzRoy, F. [1979]: 
"Wage Contracts and Risk Sharing by Implicit Firm Indexing." 
Discussion Paper, International Institute for Management Berlin.) But all 
this had no lasting impact on economic policy. Weitzman's proposal is, on 
the other hand, tightly argued and forcefully presented to academics as 
well as to the public. If he succeeds in pushing this issue — and I hope he 
wil l ! — this will make an interesting case about under which conditions 
economic ideas may influence economic policy. 
It has certainly been a good idea to make this book also accessible to 
the German public. The translation is adequate. Siebert's comment is 
helpful. He takes this book as evidence, however, against a saying by 
Goethe to the effect that the Germans are very skilful in rendering science 
incomprehensible. Here I cannot follow. 
E. Schlicht, Darmstadt, F .R.G. 
